17 ideas
11103 | We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine] |
11092 | A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine] |
11093 | We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine] |
11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
11096 | Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine] |
11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
11094 | 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine] |
11097 | Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine] |
17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
11095 | We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine] |
19566 | Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig] |
19568 | Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig] |
19567 | The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig] |
19570 | Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig] |
11104 | Concepts are language [Quine] |
11102 | Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine] |
19384 | Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual [Leibniz] |