13 ideas
15970 | People generalise because it is easier to understand, and that is mistaken for deep philosophy [Feynman] |
7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
9410 | Physical Laws are rhythms and patterns in nature, revealed by analysis [Feynman] |
12709 | Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz] |
18530 | Nobody understands quantum mechanics [Feynman] |
17707 | We should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces [Feynman, by Mares] |