Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Motion', 'Plurals and Complexes' and 'Principia Ethica'

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36 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10676 The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack]
10686 The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10687 Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
10677 Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10671 Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10666 Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack]
10669 Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack]
10675 A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
10673 Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
10680 The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
10684 I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
10674 A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10681 In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack]
10685 Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
10668 We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
10664 Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack]
10678 The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10665 Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack]
10682 The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
10663 A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
21233 The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
8039 Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
22151 The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
11056 The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
8033 Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
8032 Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
11050 Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
23726 Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18676 We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
11057 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
5925 The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5902 For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5903 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
5907 Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
12709 Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
10683 We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack]