39 ideas
| 19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks] |
| 19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
| 19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks] |
| 19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks] |
| 10676 | The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack] |
| 10686 | The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack] |
| 10687 | Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack] |
| 10677 | Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack] |
| 10671 | Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack] |
| 10666 | Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack] |
| 10669 | Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack] |
| 10675 | A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack] |
| 19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks] |
| 10673 | Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack] |
| 10680 | The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack] |
| 10684 | I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack] |
| 10674 | A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack] |
| 10681 | In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack] |
| 10685 | Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack] |
| 10668 | We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack] |
| 10664 | Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack] |
| 10678 | The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack] |
| 10665 | Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack] |
| 10682 | The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack] |
| 19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
| 10663 | A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack] |
| 19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks] |
| 19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks] |
| 19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks] |
| 19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks] |
| 19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks] |
| 19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks] |
| 19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks] |
| 19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
| 19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
| 19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks] |
| 19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks] |
| 12709 | Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz] |
| 10683 | We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack] |