Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Résumé of Metaphysics', 'Necessity and Non-Existence' and 'On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura)'

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27 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
15063 Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15078 There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15072 Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
15071 Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
15075 Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
12756 Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
15065 What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
15076 Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15073 Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15074 We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
15064 Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
15070 It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15068 The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
15069 Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
12755 Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
12760 Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
5049 Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
12759 There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
12718 Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11854 If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12758 It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
15067 A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K]
15077 It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
15066 B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
5048 Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
19408 To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
5050 Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz]