19 ideas
| 18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
| 18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
| 18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
| 18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
| 18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
| 18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
| 18119 | Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
| 18118 | Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
| 18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
| 12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
| 18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
| 12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
| 12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
| 12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
| 12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
| 11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
| 12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
| 18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |
| 19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |