Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Motion', 'First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness' and 'Davidson on himself'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg]
Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg]
There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz]