27 ideas
19336 | Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz] |
4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
7696 | Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette] |
19341 | There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz] |
19428 | Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz] |
15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |
8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
5047 | The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz] |
8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
19343 | We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz] |
19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |
8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |