Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Samuel Clarke', 'Analyzing Modality' and 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz'

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41 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
2098 The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz]
3646 There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz]
2104 No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
11115 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
19385 All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21346 The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz]
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
2105 Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz]
2106 The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz]
2102 Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
20965 Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
2103 The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
2100 Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
2107 No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
2101 If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
22894 If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
2099 The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz]