15 ideas
| 18281 | In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 12732 | Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes [Leibniz] |
| 19438 | Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments [Leibniz] |
| 19415 | Passions reside in confused perceptions [Leibniz] |
| 6606 | Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful" [Wittgenstein] |
| 8388 | Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley] |
| 8389 | Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley] |
| 8393 | We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley] |
| 8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
| 8392 | Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley] |
| 8399 | The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley] |
| 8391 | In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley] |
| 8394 | Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley] |
| 8398 | Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley] |
| 19439 | God produces possibilities, and thus ideas [Leibniz] |