Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason', 'Logological Fragments I' and 'Mental Events'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

25 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
19579 The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
19583 Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
19581 A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
19584 Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
22025 Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
5060 All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
22067 Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
4983 There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3529 Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
2307 Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
5497 Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
4081 Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
2321 If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
3404 Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3405 If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
16041 Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
6620 Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3429 Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
19585 Every person has his own language [Novalis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
19582 Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
22027 Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
19580 If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
5059 Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
3524 Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
3526 Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]