78 ideas
15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
1502 | Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides] |
19404 | Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
449 | Being is not divisible, since it is all alike [Parmenides] |
448 | No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides] |
447 | Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides] |
445 | The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides] |
1503 | There is no such thing as nothing [Parmenides] |
21820 | Parmenides at least saw Being as the same as Nous, and separate from the sensed realm [Parmenides, by Plotinus] |
452 | All our concepts of change and permanence are just names, not the truth [Parmenides] |
15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
1504 | Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
444 | The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides] |
450 | Necessity sets limits on being, in order to give it identity [Parmenides] |
15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
451 | Thinking implies existence, because thinking depends on it [Parmenides] |
1506 | Parmenides treats perception and intellectual activity as the same [Theophrastus on Parmenides] |
3058 | Only reason can prove the truth of facts [Parmenides] |
14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
555 | People who say that the cosmos is one forget that they must explain movement [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
226 | The one is without any kind of motion [Parmenides] |
5081 | There could be movement within one thing, as there is within water [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
1509 | The one can't be divisible, because if it was it could be infinitely divided down to nothing [Parmenides, by Simplicius] |
20900 | Defenders of the One say motion needs the void - but that is not part of Being [Parmenides, by Aristotle] |
1505 | Reason sees reality as one, the senses see it as many [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
453 | Reality is symmetrical and balanced, like a sphere, with no reason to be greater one way rather than another [Parmenides] |
1792 | He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius] |
19403 | Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz] |
14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
5115 | It is feeble-minded to look for explanations of everything being at rest [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
13217 | The void can't exist, and without the void there can't be movement or separation [Parmenides, by Aristotle] |
14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
22918 | What could have triggered the beginning [of time and being]? [Parmenides] |
1794 | He was the first to discover the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius] |
1791 | He was the first person to say the earth is spherical [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius] |