Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Motion', 'Clarification and Defense of Grounding' and 'Could There Be Unicorns?'

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
16951 It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
16953 Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett]
16952 If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
16960 If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
16958 In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
17292 Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P]
17295 Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P]
17297 A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P]
17302 Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P]
17303 The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17294 Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P]
17300 If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17296 We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
17301 Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
17293 Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16957 Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
16959 If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17298 Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
17299 There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
16956 To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
16954 Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
12709 Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz]