Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Johann Bernoulli', 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority' and 'Moral Philosophy meets social psychology'

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15 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz]
Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it [Harman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman]
If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman]
Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman]