Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Aristotle and Descartes on Matter', 'How Things Might Have Been' and 'Laws in Nature'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford]
Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford]
Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford]
Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford]
If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford]
If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford]
The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford]
You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford]