15 ideas
| 14742 | It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N] |
| 23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
| 12729 | The cause of a change is not the real influence, but whatever gives a reason for the change [Leibniz] |
| 23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
| 23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
| 23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
| 23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
| 23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
| 23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
| 23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
| 23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
| 23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
| 23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
| 23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
| 18885 | Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N] |