11 ideas
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 22371 | Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 22372 | Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot] |
| 5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
| 22373 | People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot] |
| 5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
| 5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |