9 ideas
21546 | We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell] |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
12710 | As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz] |
21531 | Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell] |
21545 | I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |