19 ideas
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
17486 | Supervenience is simply modally robust property co-variance [Hendry] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
17481 | Nuclear charge (plus laws) explains electron structure and spectrum, but not vice versa [Hendry] |
17478 | Maybe two kinds are the same if there is no change of entropy on isothermal mixing [Hendry] |
17479 | The nature of an element must survive chemical change, so it is the nucleus, not the electrons [Hendry] |
17484 | Maybe the nature of water is macroscopic, and not in the microstructure [Hendry] |
17485 | Maybe water is the smallest part of it that still counts as water (which is H2O molecules) [Hendry] |
17483 | Water continuously changes, with new groupings of molecules [Hendry] |
17482 | Compounds can differ with the same collection of atoms, so structure matters too [Hendry] |
17476 | Elements survive chemical change, and are tracked to explain direction and properties [Hendry] |
17477 | Defining elements by atomic number allowed atoms of an element to have different masses [Hendry] |
17480 | Generally it is nuclear charge (not nuclear mass) which determines behaviour [Hendry] |
2116 | The concept of an existing thing must contain more than the concept of a non-existing thing [Leibniz] |