19 ideas
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
12899 | The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis] |
12897 | To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis] |
12898 | Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis] |
12895 | Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
19562 | We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
13195 | To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz] |
13193 | Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz] |
13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |
13196 | All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz] |
13192 | Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz] |