Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'True Method in Philosophy and Theology', 'Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance' and 'Properties'

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7 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
19393 What is not active is nothing [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
18430 We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18432 Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
18437 Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
18434 That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
13965 Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
13964 Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]