Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Notes on John Wilkins', 'Philosophy of Language' and 'Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality [Hofweber]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics? [Hofweber]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc) [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything [Leibniz]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]