Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Bouvet', 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics' and 'Against Liberalism'

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69 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber]
If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber]
The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber]
'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes]
Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes]
Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes]
Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes]
Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes]
Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes]
Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes]
Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes]
Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts [Leibniz]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes]
Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes]
Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes]
Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes]
Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes]
It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes]
The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes]