22 ideas
18365 | If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David] |
18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
18360 | It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David] |
18358 | Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David] |
18355 | What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David] |
18354 | Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David] |
18356 | Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David] |
18363 | Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David] |
18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
18364 | Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David] |
18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
18361 | A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David] |
12710 | As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz] |
18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |