59 ideas
| 15879 | The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré] |
| 15891 | Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré] |
| 15878 | Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré] |
| 15874 | Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré] |
| 15884 | Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré] |
| 15880 | In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré] |
| 15869 | Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré] |
| 15881 | We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré] |
| 15882 | Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré] |
| 15888 | The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré] |
| 15887 | 'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré] |
| 15889 | It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré] |
| 15890 | Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré] |
| 15885 | The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré] |
| 15868 | Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré] |
| 20589 | Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20583 | If maximising pleasure needs measurement, so does fulfilling desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20584 | Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20598 | In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20614 | People often have greater attachment to ethnic or tribal groups than to the state [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20596 | For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20593 | The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20608 | Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20597 | If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20606 | Epistemic theories defend democracy as more likely to produce the right answer [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20600 | Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20609 | If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20605 | Rights as interests (unlike rights as autonomy) supports mandatory voting [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20599 | How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20601 | Discussion before voting should be an essential part of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20613 | We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20586 | Free speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20587 | Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20591 | If there is no suffering, wealth inequalities don't matter much [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20602 | Some rights are 'claims' that other people should act in a certain way [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20604 | Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20603 | One theory (fairly utilitarian) says rights protect interests (but it needs to cover trivial interests) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20607 | Having a right does not entail further rights needed to implement it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20612 | If being subject to the law resembles a promise, we are morally obliged to obey it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20611 | If others must obey laws that we like, we must obey laws that they like? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20610 | Instead of against natural law, we might assess unjust laws against the values of the culture [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20617 | How should the punishment fit the crime (for stealing chickens?) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20615 | Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20616 | During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20620 | If minority views are accepted in debate, then religious views must be accepted [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20619 | Is abortion the ending of a life, or a decision not to start one? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 15886 | Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré] |
| 15864 | Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré] |
| 15865 | Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré] |
| 15862 | Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré] |
| 15870 | Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré] |
| 15871 | Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré] |
| 15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
| 15860 | We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré] |
| 15872 | Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré] |
| 15867 | Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré] |
| 15892 | Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré] |
| 15875 | In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré] |
| 12709 | Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz] |