Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Résumé of Metaphysics', 'Model Theory' and 'Principia Mathematica'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


37 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
|= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead]
Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
|= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W]
Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W]
Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / a. Defining numbers
Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend]
Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes]
'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman]
The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead]
The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead]
The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead]
Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz]