13 ideas
15787 | Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan] |
15784 | The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan] |
13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
15792 | Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan] |
13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan] |
15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan] |
15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
12719 | Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz] |
13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |
12720 | Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz] |