Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Notes on John Wilkins', 'Sapiens: brief history of humankind' and 'The Conscious Mind'

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82 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
The Scientific Revolution was the discovery of our own ignorance [Harari]
For millenia people didn't know how to convert one type of energy into another [Harari]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything [Leibniz]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers]
Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers]
What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers]
Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers]
Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers]
Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Money does produce happiness, but only up to a point [Harari]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
If a group is bound by gossip, the natural size is 150 people [Harari]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
Since 1500 human population has increased fourteenfold, and consumption far more [Harari]
People 300m tons; domesticated animals 700m tons; larger wild animals 100m tons [Harari]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The Nazi aim was to encourage progressive evolution, and avoid degeneration [Harari]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
We stabilise societies with dogmas, either of dubious science, or of non-scientific values [Harari]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The state fostered individualism, to break the power of family and community [Harari]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
In 1750 losing your family and community meant death [Harari]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
The sacred command of capitalism is that profits must be used to increase production [Harari]
The main rule of capitalism is that all other goods depend on economic growth [Harari]
The progress of capitalism depends entirely on the new discoveries and gadgets of science [Harari]
In capitalism the rich invest, and the rest of us go shopping [Harari]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
No market is free of political bias, and markets need protection of their freedoms [Harari]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom may work against us, as individuals can choose to leave, and make fewer commitments [Harari]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
Real peace is the implausibility of war (and not just its absence) [Harari]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
Financing is increasingly through credit rather than taxes; people prefer investing to taxation [Harari]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
The more you know about history, the harder it becomes to explain [Harari]
History teaches us that the present was not inevitable, and shows us the possibilities [Harari]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 1. Monotheism
In order to explain both order and evil, a single evil creator is best, but no one favours that [Harari]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 1. Animism
Animism is belief that every part of nature is aware and feeling, and can communicate [Harari]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Most polytheist recognise one supreme power or law, behind the various gods [Harari]
Polytheism is open-minded, and rarely persecutes opponents [Harari]
Mythologies are usual contracts with the gods, exchanging devotion for control of nature [Harari]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
Dualist religions see everything as a battleground of good and evil forces [Harari]
Dualist religions say the cosmos is a battleground, so can’t explain its order [Harari]
Manichaeans and Gnostics: good made spirit, evil made flesh [Harari]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 1. Monotheistic Religion
Monotheism appeared in Egypt in 1350 BCE, when the god Aten was declared supreme [Harari]