14 ideas
6710 | You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James] |
22305 | If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James] |
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |
5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |