Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'On the analysis of moral judgements' and 'Mathematical Logic (revised)'

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
18806 Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
12221 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
8490 First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8492 Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
19321 We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8487 Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18899 Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
4028 Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
8489 The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9947 Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
10319 An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
8488 A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
9948 Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
4972 I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
6968 Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer]
6972 A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
6973 Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer]
6974 Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6971 I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
6969 Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer]
6970 Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
8491 The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]