Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Proslogion' and 'works'

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32 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Special relativity, unlike general relativity, was operationalist in spirit [Putnam on Einstein]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Einstein took causation to be the bedrock of physics [Einstein, by Coveney/Highfield]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
General relativity assumes laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference [Einstein, by Close]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Newton is a special case of Einstein's general theory, with an infinite speed of light [Einstein, by Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
The theory is 'special' because it sticks to observers moving straight, at constant speeds [Einstein, by Farmelo]
Assume the speed of light is constant for all observers, and the laws of physics are the same [Einstein, by Farmelo]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
General Relativity says there is no absolute force or acceleration [Einstein, by Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
Mass is a measure of energy content [Einstein]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space-time arises from the connection between measurements of space and of time [Einstein, by Farmelo]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm]
An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm]
Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm]
If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm]
A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm]
The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm]
Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm]
Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm]
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
I do not believe in a personal God [Einstein]