Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Proslogion' and 'On 'Insolubilia' and their solution'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
18806 Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
21563 The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
8490 First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8492 Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
21565 Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
21564 Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8487 Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18899 Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
4028 Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
8489 The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9947 Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
10319 An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
8488 A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
9948 Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
4972 I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
21241 Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm]
21243 An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm]
21244 Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm]
21242 If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm]
1421 A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm]
21245 The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm]
21246 Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm]
21247 Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
1420 Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm]
8491 The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]