20 ideas
4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
8447 | In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege] |
8448 | Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege] |
4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske] |
4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske] |
4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |
8446 | We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege] |
8449 | Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege] |
4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |