Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'The Empirical Stance' and 'The Tragedy of Reason'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


35 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik]
In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik]
The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik]
Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik]
Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik]
Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik]
Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik]
Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]