Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Vagueness' and 'Substance and Essence in Aristotle'

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith]
Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Reality is directional [Witt]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]