32 ideas
| 18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
| 8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
| 8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
| 8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
| 18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
| 6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
| 4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
| 6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
| 8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
| 6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
| 6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
| 6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
| 6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
| 6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
| 6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
| 6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
| 6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
| 6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
| 6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
| 6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
| 6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 6004 | The cardinal virtues are theoretical (based on knowledge), and others are 'non-theoretical' [Hecato, by Dorandi] |
| 6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
| 6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |
| 8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |