21 ideas
2661 | Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero] |
2673 | There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
2669 | Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
2664 | If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero] |
2665 | How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero] |
8875 | Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B] |
20800 | Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
2672 | Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |