41 ideas
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
8833 | Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P] |
13886 | Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9845 | We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege] |
10019 | Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
9886 | Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege] |
9889 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
10020 | Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege] |
10553 | A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett] |
9887 | Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett] |
8751 | Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
9891 | The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
8834 | Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P] |
8838 | If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P] |
8839 | Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
9890 | The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege] |
11846 | If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |