Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Confessions of a Philosopher' and 'Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols)'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]