Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Confessions of a Philosopher' and 'Introduction to Mathematical Logic'

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33 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Post proved the consistency of propositional logic in 1921 [Walicki]
Propositional language can only relate statements as the same or as different [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Boolean connectives are interpreted as functions on the set {1,0} [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The empty set is useful for defining sets by properties, when the members are not yet known [Walicki]
The empty set avoids having to take special precautions in case members vanish [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
Ordinals play the central role in set theory, providing the model of well-ordering [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
To determine the patterns in logic, one must identify its 'building blocks' [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A 'model' of a theory specifies interpreting a language in a domain to make all theorems true [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
The L-S Theorem says no theory (even of reals) says more than a natural number theory [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
A compact axiomatisation makes it possible to understand a field as a whole [Walicki]
Axiomatic systems are purely syntactic, and do not presuppose any interpretation [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Ordinals are transitive sets of transitive sets; or transitive sets totally ordered by inclusion [Walicki]
Ordinals are the empty set, union with the singleton, and any arbitrary union of ordinals [Walicki]
The union of finite ordinals is the first 'limit ordinal'; 2ω is the second... [Walicki]
Two infinite ordinals can represent a single infinite cardinal [Walicki]
Members of ordinals are ordinals, and also subsets of ordinals [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
In non-Euclidean geometry, all Euclidean theorems are valid that avoid the fifth postulate [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Inductive proof depends on the choice of the ordering [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Scotus based modality on semantic consistency, instead of on what the future could allow [Walicki]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]