12 ideas
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
7791 | The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
8447 | In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege] |
8448 | Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege] |
11002 | Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
8446 | We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege] |
8449 | Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege] |