68 ideas
| 13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
| 13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
| 10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
| 10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
| 10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
| 8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
| 8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
| 9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
| 13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
| 13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
| 17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
| 17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
| 13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
| 10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
| 17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
| 13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
| 13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
| 13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
| 8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
| 7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
| 13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
| 13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
| 13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
| 13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
| 13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
| 18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
| 10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
| 10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
| 13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
| 10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
| 10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
| 10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
| 4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
| 10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
| 10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
| 10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
| 10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
| 9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
| 13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
| 10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
| 10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
| 10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
| 13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
| 13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
| 10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
| 13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
| 13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
| 13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
| 10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
| 10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
| 10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
| 10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |
| 8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |