66 ideas
20186 | Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused [Zagzebski] |
19694 | Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Zagzebski, by Whitcomb] |
20221 | Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition [Zagzebski] |
20220 | Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory [Zagzebski] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
20188 | Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding [Zagzebski] |
20223 | Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding [Zagzebski] |
20217 | Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable [Zagzebski] |
20191 | Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so [Zagzebski] |
20222 | Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski] |
10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
20225 | For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski] |
20226 | Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski] |
20228 | We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski] |
20227 | Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski] |
20194 | Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski] |
20210 | A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski] |
20206 | Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski] |
20208 | We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski] |
20215 | A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski] |
20187 | Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski] |
20218 | The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski] |
20205 | The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful [Zagzebski] |
10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
20202 | Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims [Zagzebski] |
20216 | Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment [Zagzebski] |
20193 | Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski] |
20199 | Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski] |
20196 | Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues [Zagzebski] |
20200 | A virtue must always have a corresponding vice [Zagzebski] |
20201 | Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [Zagzebski, by PG] |
20203 | Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends [Zagzebski] |
20207 | Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence [Zagzebski] |
20214 | Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski] |
20213 | We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues [Zagzebski] |
20209 | For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly [Zagzebski] |
20197 | The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having [Zagzebski] |
10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |