23 ideas
2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
7388 | McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn] |
2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
3185 | Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |