Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Concept and Object', 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz' and 'On the Frame of Reference'

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22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
4975 A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10009 Substitutional quantification is just a variant of Tarski's account [Wallace, by Baldwin]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
9949 There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18995 Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
10317 It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
10535 Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9839 Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
4973 As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
9167 Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
4974 For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege]