Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'fragments/reports' and 'Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


20 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Crates lived in poverty, and treated his whole life as a joke [Crates of Thebes, by Plutarch]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Everyone should study philosophy until they see all people in the same light [Crates of Thebes, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]