Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Davidson on himself' and 'Letters to Antoine Arnauld'

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70 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz]
A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz]
Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz]
Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz]
Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz]
If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz]
Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / c. Animal Souls
Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz]