44 ideas
6161 | Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands] |
3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
6163 | If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
6155 | Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
6154 | It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands] |
6157 | Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands] |
6159 | Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands] |
3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
6152 | Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands] |
6173 | Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands] |
6174 | If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands] |
3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
6158 | Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands] |
3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
6168 | The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands] |
3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
6167 | Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands] |
6177 | Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands] |
3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
6156 | The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands] |
6170 | Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands] |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
6178 | It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |