Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Davidson on himself' and 'The Book of Chuang Tzu'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Words of wisdom are precise and clear [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Don't even start, let's just stay put [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Disagreement means you do not understand at all [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
If you beat me in argument, does that mean you are right? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Do not try to do things, or to master knowledge; just be empty [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
You know you were dreaming when you wake, but there might then be a greater awakening from that [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
Did Chuang Tzu dream he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dream he was Chuang Tzu? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The perfect man has no self [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
To see with true clarity, your self must be irrelevant [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
If words can't be defined, they may just be the chirruping of chicks [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Great courage is not violent [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
As all life is one, what need is there for words? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 2. Taoism
Go with the flow, and be one with the void of Heaven [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
Fish forget about each other in the pond and forget each other in the Tao [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]