61 ideas
23917 | Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
5869 | The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
22505 | The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle] |
22513 | Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle] |
19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
23906 | Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle] |
20204 | Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle] |
22506 | A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle] |
22504 | Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle] |
22510 | Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle] |
23913 | Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle] |
22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle] |
22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle] |
22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle] |
23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle] |
22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle] |
18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle] |
23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle] |
5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle] |
5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
5876 | Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle] |
5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle] |
5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle] |
5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle] |
22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle] |
22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle] |
23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle] |
23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle] |
23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle] |
23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle] |
23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle] |
23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle] |
5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle] |
23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle] |
23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle] |
23915 | The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle] |
23916 | The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle] |
5866 | It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle] |
5878 | Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle] |
5873 | Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |